Safety device upgrade for robotic cells : Machine safety by Ojalehto, Erkki
 Erkki Ojalehto 
Safety device upgrade for robotic cells 
Machine safety 
Bachelor’s Thesis 
Spring 2014 
School of Technology 
Automation Engineering 
2 
 
SEINÄJOKI UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES 
Thesis abstract 
Faculty: School of Technology 
Degree programme: Automation Engineering 
Specialisation: Machine Automation 
Author: Erkki Ojalehto 
Title of thesis: Safety device upgrade for robotic cells 
Supervisor: Martti Lehtonen 
Year: 2014  Number of pages: 62 Number of appendices: 4 
The purpose of this thesis was to improve the safety of robotic cells at Valio Ltd’s 
factories of edible fat. All safety devices, used in the cells, were inspected. Based 
on the perceptions, mechanical improvements were made. 
The safety switches of the robotic cells’ service doors were estimated insufficient 
in reliability. For this reason, improvements for the cells’ safety-related control 
system were designed. Improvements were planned to the other parts of the 
palletising system at the same time. 
The theory part concentrates on standards, risk assessment, and especially the 
safety-related control system. For the improvement of the robotic cells, a new 
performance level was calculated with the help of standard ISO 13849-1 and the 
SISTEMA software.  
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Opinnäytetyön tarkoitus oli parantaa Seinäjoen Valio Oy:n ravintorasvatehtaan 
robottisolujen turvallisuutta. Työssä tarkastettiin kaikki soluissa käytetyt 
turvalaitteet. Tarkastusten perusteella tehtiin mekaanisia parannuksia 
turvalaitteisiin. 
Robottisolujen huolto-ovia valvovat turvarajat arvioitiin riittämättömän luotettaviksi. 
Tästä syystä soluihin suunniteltiin parannuksia turvallisuuteen liittyvään 
ohjausjärjestelmään. Parannuksia suunniteltiin samalla muihin lavausjärjestelmän 
osiin. 
Teoria osassa on perehdytty standardeihin, riskiarviointiin, sekä erityisesti 
turvallisuuteen liittyvään ohjausjärjestelmään. Robottisolujen parannukselle 
laskettiin uusi suoritustaso standardia ISO 13849-1 ja SISTEMA ohjelmaa 
käyttäen.  
Avainsanat: koneturvallisuus, riskin vähentäminen, turvallisuuteen liittyvä 
ohjausjärjestelmä 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Valio Ltd 
Valio Ltd is a Finnish dairy company, which is owned by 18 dairy cooperatives. 
Company has 15 production plants in Finland and five subsidiaries in other 
countries. Valio Ltd was founded in 1905 in order to increase butter export and to 
improve the quality of the butter. Demand for Valio Ltd’s dairy products increased 
quickly, so the company started to refine also other products to the markets. The 
sales in 2012 were 2 billion euros, when the share of domestic market was 64 
percent. Valio Ltd gives the market profits to milk producers through dairy 
cooperatives. Milk employs around 30 000 people in Finland from which Valio Ltd 
employs 4600. (Valio Ltd 2014a) 
Valio Ltd’s production plant in Seinäjoki produces modern milk powders, edible 
fats and perishables. The products are made in three individual factory units in 
Seinäjoki. The production plant in Seinäjoki employs in total 360 people in 
production and laboratory. Familiar products made in Seinäjoki production plant 
are for example Valio butter, Valio Oivariini®, KevytLevi®, Valio Gefilus® power 
drinks and Valio HeVi™ shots. Production plant’s raw milk is collected from 1000 
milk producers. (Valio Ltd 2014b) 
All Valio Ltd’s edible fats and spreads are made in the fat factory unit in Seinäjoki. 
The fat factory unit has four production lines for butter and ten different packaging 
lines. The fat factory unit’s final products are wrapped butter, spreads and bigger 
butter bricks for industrial purposes. (Valio Ltd 2014b) 
 
Figure 1 Logo of Valio Ltd. 
(Valio Ltd 2014b) 
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1.2 Backround 
The purpose of this thesis was to improve the safety level of a pallet loading 
system, used in the fat factory unit. The research work focused on the pallet 
loading system’s robotic cells and their safety devices. With the gained information 
and actions conducted through this thesis, possible hazard situations can be 
prevented in the robotic cells.  
Actualised hazard situations during production initiated the research work. Safety 
device failures associated to robotic cells took place in the perishables’ factory 
unit. Safety device checks were considered necessary also in the fat factory unit.  
Human access to the hazard zones is prevented with fences and service doors. 
Service doors’ position is supervised with a safety switch, which prevents the robot 
from operating if the door is open. Service doors’ function was inspected and 
improved so that hazard situations are henceforth extremely improbable. 
1.3 Structure of the research 
Report starts with a theory part about machine safety. Standard ISO 13849-1 is 
dealt with by its outlines. This standard is essential for this research because the 
standard is dealing with the safety-related control system. Control systems can be 
dealt with the standard IEC 62061 also, but because of the SISTEMA program 
used in this work, standard ISO 13849-1 was selected. SISTEMA uses standard 
13849-1 to determine the performance level of a safety device or devices.  
The theory section of the thesis includes basic information about machine safety 
standards, risk evaluation and machine modifications and also safety components 
- and fieldbus technology used in Valio Ltd’s robotic cells. The experimental part of 
the thesis deals with the pallet loading system’s working principle and the notes 
made during inspections. Safety device improvements were verified with ISO 
13849-1 standard and SISTEMA program. SISTEMA calculation report is attached 
to the annex part of this thesis. 
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2 MACHINE SAFETY 
2.1 General information about machine safety standards 
Machine safety standards are divided into three groups, A-, B- and C-type of 
standards. 
- Type A standards are basic safety standards, which outline basic concepts, 
principles for design, and general aspects that can be applied to all 
machinery. 
- Type B standards are generic safety standards dealing with one safety 
aspect or one type of safeguard that can be used across a wide range of 
machinery. 
- Type C standards are machine safety standards dealing with detailed safety 
requirements for a particular machine or group of machines. 
(Schneider Electric 2009) 
2.2 Machine modifacation or modernization 
Modification of old machines, or addition of new equipment can convert the old 
machine in a way that it must be considered as a new machine. This signifies that 
machine’s entirety has changed in terms of machine safety. The new machine 
must fulfil these demands: 
- Machine safety regulation annex 1 
- Declaration of conformity 
- Technical structure report 
- Equipped with CE marking 
(Siirilä 2008, p55) 
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Even if the planned changes do not create a new machine, it is still important to 
make a contract between the orderer and supplier of the changing work stating 
that who will be responsible for the safety. Unless otherwise agreed, the owner of 
the machine will have the responsibility. (Siirilä 2008, p55) 
The machine modernization belongs to the scope of the labour protection act. The 
implementer has an obligation to complete the work in client's order so that the 
end result is safe. The owner has a responsibility to use an implementer which is 
capable of achieving the modernization in such a way that the end result is safe. In 
addition, the owner must define work safety issues to the implementer related to 
the modernization and ensure that the equipment suppliers provide suitable 
devices for the new application. (Sundquist 2010) 
2.3 Machine’s risk assessment 
Potential risks are searched from the machine with a risk assessment. These risks 
can be, for example, machine’s spinning sprockets or shafts. There are several 
methods for defining the risk. The method chosen for the risk assessment in this 
thesis is from Siirilä’s machine safety book 2008, where risks are assessed by 
their severity (Table 1) and probability (Table 2). As a result a numeric value for a 
risk has been created (Table 3),  and used to determine what kind of actions need 
to take place in order to reduce the risk (Table 4). The risk can be reduced for 
example with different kinds of physical obstacles like fences. The risk must be low 
enough before the machine can be used.  
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Table 1 Severity of the harm. 
(Siirilä 2008, p98) 
Severity 
100 Death, coma, brain damage 
90 Two limb loss, blinding, become paralyzed 
80 Two limb loss, blinding, become paralyzed 
70 Limb -, eye -, hearing loss, or several amount of finger loss 
60 Limb -, eye -, hearing loss, or several amount of finger loss 
50 Big bone fracture, serious injuries (curable), incurable light injuries 
40 Big bone fracture, serious injuries (curable), incurable light injuries 
30 Light bone fracture or minor injuries (curable) 
20 Wound, chafe, illness 
10 Scratches, bruises 
1 No consequenses 
Table 2 Probability of the harm. 
(Siirilä 2008, p108) 
Probability 
1 Occurrence is certain 
0,9 Occurrence almost certain, would be surprising if not happen 
0,8 Very certain 
0,7 Possible, occurrence would be not unconventional or surprising 
0,6 Happening and not happening are about as likely 
0,5 Happening and not happening are about as likely 
0,4 Possible, but unusual 
0,3 Unusual 
0,2 Very Unusual, thinkable 
0,1 Extremely implausible, almost impossible 
 
The numeric value of the risk consists of the severity and probability of harm by 
multiplying with each other. The risk is divided into five areas, see tables 3 and 4. 
Table 4 states required actions for each risk area. (Siirilä 2008, p107-108) 
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Table 3 Determination of the risk by the severity and probability of harm multiplied 
with themselves. 
(Siirilä 2008, p109) 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
1 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
0,9 0,9 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 
0,8 0,8 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 80 
0,7 0,7 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 
0,6 0,6 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
0,5 0,5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
0,4 0,4 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 
0,3 0,3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
0,2 0,2 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
0,1 0,1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Severity 
Table 4 Required actions based on  the risk. 
(Siirilä 2008, p108) 
Risk level Required actions 
Value Description Existing machinery New machines 
0.1 ... 5 Slight risk Actions not needed Actions not needed 
6 ... 15 Tolerable risk 
Machine can be used but 
tracking is necessary 
Machine can be used but 
tracking is necessary 
16 ... 28 Moderate risk 
Machine can be used, but 
required fixes must be planned 
and implemented soon as 
possible. 
Planning must be continued, 
risk must be lowered. 
29 ... 48 Significant risk 
Production interruptions must 
be considered. If production is 
proceeded, fixes must be 
carried out immediately and  
lots of resources must be used. 
Planning must be continued, 
risk must be lowered 
49 ... 100 
Intolerable 
risk 
Production must be 
interrupted immediately. 
Production can proceed again 
when the risk is lower or equal 
than tolerable. 
Planning must be continued, 
risk must be lowered 
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2.4 Control system’s examination with help of standard 
Standard ISO 13849-1 can be used to evaluate the structure and safety of the 
machine’s safety-related control system. The control system’s safety evaluation 
can also be carried out with an alternative standard IEC 62061. Table 5 describes 
the recommended applications for both standards. The use of either of these 
standards, in accordance with their scopes, can be presumed to fulfil the relevant 
essential safety requirements. (SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p13) 
Table 5 Suggested applications of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p13) 
 
In standard ISO 13849-1 control system’s safety is called performance level (PL). 
The ability to perform a safety task is divided into five performance levels a, b, c, d, 
e. The highest safety performance is achieved with PL e, and the lowest with PL a.  
If the standard IEC 62061 is used, safety is called safety integrity level (SIL). 
Safety integrity level is divided into four levels, SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3 and SIL 4.  
SIL 4 is intended to be used for process industrial purposes to prevent 
catastrophes. It isn’t meaningful for machine safety usage. Table 6 presents the 
relation between performance level and safety integrity level. PL has no 
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correspondence on the SIL scale and it is mainly used to reduce the risk of slight 
injuries. (SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p45) 
Table 6 Relation between performance level (PL) and safety integrity level (SIL). 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p45) 
 
The required performance level of the machine’s safety devices is defined 
according to the risk (Figure 2). A safety device which has been implemented with 
a control system always consists of several safety components. The required 
performance level is a combination of these components.  
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Figure 2 Definition of the required performance level PLr. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p101) 
2.4.1 Designated architectures 
Control system’s PL is strongly dependent on the used designated architecture. 
These architectures are called category B, category 1, category 2, category 3 and 
category 4. Category B is the most simple and category 4 the most complex. The 
actual differences between these categories are the mean time to a dangerous 
failure (MTTFd) and an average diagnostic coverage (DCavg). The given PL can be 
achieved with many alternative categories as can be seen in figure 3. For 
example, if a safety device is designed to be used extremely rarely or, if high 
quality components are used, the PL might be slightly higher. 
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Figure 3 Relationship between categories’ DCavg, MTTFd and PL. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p53) 
In category B components, which are expected to endure specific conditions, will 
be used. Basic safety principles will be used. The range of MTTFd must be from 3 
to 29 years. A fault in the system can lead to the loss of the safety function. (Siirilä 
2009, p143) 
In category 1 the requirements of B, as well as well-tried components and well-
tried safety principles, will be used. The range of MTTFd must be from 30 to 100 
years. A fault in the system can lead to the loss of the safety function, but the 
probability of harm is lower. (Siirilä 2009, p143 – 144) 
In category 2 the requirements of B and the well-tried safety principles will be 
used with an external testing unit. The testing appliances must check the safety 
device’s proper operation, at least 100 times between the needs of the safety 
device. The range of MTTFd will be from 3 to 100 years and DCavg can be from 60 
to 98 percentages. (Siirilä 2009, p144) 
In category 3 the requirements of B and the well-tried safety principles will be 
used. The control system must be capable to perform a safety task, even though 
20 
 
the system has one failure.  The majority of failures have to be revealed. The 
range of MTTFd will be from 3 to 100 years and DCavg must be from 60 to 98 
percentages. (Siirilä 2009, p144) 
In category 4 the requirements of B and the well-tried safety principles will be 
used. The control system must be capable to expose all failures in the control 
system. The system is implemented with an automatic monitoring system. The 
range of MTTFd will be from 30 to 100 years and DCavg must be equal or over 99 
percentages. (Siirilä 2009, p144) 
Categories B, 1 and 2 are single channel devices. Fault exposing ability is 
implemented in categories 3 and 4 with two channels. The probability of common 
cause failures (CCF) must be low in categories 2, 3 and 4. 
2.4.2 MTTFd of single channels 
Manufacturers of safety components guarantee service life of their components 
with B10d - or B10 –value, which can be used to calculate MTTFd. The B10d –value 
means how many cycles component will last until 10% of the components will fail 
dangerously. The B10 -value means component’s service life, without considering 
the dangerous failures. If the ration of dangerous failures of B10 is not given by the 
manufacturer, ration of 50% can be used. B10d and B10 are intended for pneumatic 
- and electromechanical components only. (SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p111) 
Single channels’ mean time to dangerous failure, indicated with three levels: low, 
medium and high, presented at table 7. These levels are used for determination of 
safety related control system’s performance level. 
Table 7 Mean time to failure of each channel. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p45) 
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With the following formulas, single component’s - and each channel’s MTTFd –
value can be estimated. The formulas are based on to the ISO 13849-1’s annexes 
C and D. 
MTTFd of single component:  
      
    
       
     (1) 
where 
MTTFd = single component’s value. 
    
              ⁄
      
     (2) 
hop = mean operation, in hours per day. 
dop = mean operation, in days per year. 
tcycle = mean time between the beginning of two successive cycles of the 
component. 
MTTFd of each channel: 
When each individual safety component’s MTTFd –value is calculated, whole 
channel’s MTTFd is calculated with formula as presented below: 
 
     
 ∑
 
      
 
 ̃
   
∑
  
      
 ̃
   
   (3) 
where 
MTTFd = complete channel’s value. 
MTTFdi & MTTFdj = MTTFd of each component which has a contribution to the 
safety function. 
In two channel control systems, channels can be combined with formula as 
presented below, if MTTFd -values differ from each other. It is also permissible to 
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straightaway use the channel, which has lower MTTFd –value. It is not necessary 
to combine the channels. 
MTTFd of combined channels: 
      
 
 
[                  
 
 
        
 
 
        
]  (4) 
where 
MTTFd = combined channels. 
MTTFdC1 & MTTFdC2 = two different redundant channels. 
2.4.3 Diagnostic coverage (DC) 
Diagnostic coverage means machine’s safety-related control system’s ability to 
detect a fault from itself. The DC is divided into four levels, low, medium, high or 
none (table 8). Levels are used to determine PL of safety-related control systems. 
To be practicable, the number of ranges is restricted to four. Higher DC –value 
than 99 percentage is very difficult to achieve in complex systems. (SFS EN ISO 
13849-1, p49) 
Table 8 Diagnostic coverage. 
(SFS-EN ISO 13849-1, p49) 
 
According to the standard ISO 13849-1, diagnostic coverage of logic, input – and 
output devices are determined in tables 9, 10 and 11 according to their testing 
device’ function. Suitable section is evaluated and selected from the tables for 
each safety device. 
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Table 9 Evaluation of input devices diagnostic coverage. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, annex E) 
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Table 10 Evaluation of logics diagnostic coverage. 
(SFS-EN-ISO 13849-1, annex E) 
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Table 11 Evaluation of output devices diagnostic coverage. 
(SFS-EN-ISO 13849-1, annex E) 
 
Entire safety feature’s diagnostic coverage is called average diagnostic coverage 
(DCavg). This is defined from each individual control system’s component that 
participates into safety function. Both values, MTTFd and DC are used to calculate 
the DCavg. Average diagnostic coverage is necessary for defining the performance 
level of the safety function and it is calculated with the formula presented below. 
The formula is from ISO 13849-1’s, annex E. 
       
   
      
 
   
      
   
   
      
 
      
 
 
      
   
 
      
   (5) 
where 
DCavg = safety feature’s control system’s average diagnostic coverage. 
MTTFd1, MTTFd2, MTTFdN = MTTFd of each component which has a contribution to 
the safety function. 
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2.4.4 Common cause failure (CCF) 
Common cause failure means a failure that has simultaneously affectivity to more 
than one component. Safety-related control system’s must be able to cope from 
CCF problems and keep system safety. (Siirilä 2009, p.155) 
The avoidance of CCF is given scores from 0 to 100. Sufficient prevention of CCF 
will be reached when the points are a total of 65 or more. The following table 12 
shows the different methods for preventing the CCF. [SFS-EN ISO 13849-1, 
annex F] 
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Table 12 Common cause failures’ prevention with ISO 13849-1. 
(SFS EN ISO 13849-1, annex F) 
 
2.5 Performance requirements for robot’s safety-related parts 
According to the robot standard EN ISO 10218-2: 
Safety-related parts of control systems shall be implemented so that 
they comply with PL d with category 3 as described in EN ISO 13849-
1. If IEC 62061 is used in the designation, control systems safety 
related parts will be designed so that they comply with SIL 2 with 
hardware fault tolerance of 1. (EN ISO 10218-2, p10) 
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2.6 Starting the machine 
The machine can be started locally or by remote control. The remote controller can 
be used when it is ensured that the risk does not arise. In most cases, machines 
are equipped with a manual reset button. Button’s function is to prevent 
unexpected start of the machine. Machine’s reset function can be executed a way 
that several buttons must be pushed in the correct order to allow the machine to 
start. If the machine has hazardous zones, where user cannot see clearly, the 
multi-reset system gives a safety benefit. Additional reset button should be 
installed place, with a clear view to the danger zone. (SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p68-
70) 
2.7 Stopping the machine 
When machine receives a stop command, the machine must slow the speed down 
to standstill as fast as possible. The stop command is prioritized to the highest 
level of the machine program. So by pressing the start and stop buttons at the 
same time, the stop is activated. (SFS EN ISO 13849-1, p68) 
An emergency stop command might cause difficulties into production, particular to 
the re-starting of the machine. If the machine must necessarily do the movement 
completely, the machine could be equipped with an interlocking device. 
Interlocking device prevents human to access dangerous zones when machine 
moves. The locking devices are opened and accession allowed to hazard zones, 
once the machine is standstill. (SFS-EN ISO 13849-1, p70) 
Interlocking devices are generally applied to machines that cannot be stopped 
quickly for reason such as high inertia. Machine’s flywheel might have such a 
spinning mass that the machine cannot be stopped quickly. 
Machine stoppages are divided into three classes according to ISO 13 850 and EN 
60204-1 by. Classes differ from each other by their stop functionality. Safety-
related stoppages are often classes 0 or 1. The class depends on to the machine-
specific C-type standard. (Siirilä 2009, p278) 
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- In class 0 stop, power supply is switched off immediately. Machine’s 
movements will slow down freely or with assisted brake. 
- In class 1 stop, machine’s power is maintained to provide controlled stop. 
The power supply is switched off after the stop. 
- In class 2 stop, machine’s power is maintained to provide controlled stop. 
The power can be used to keep the machine in place. 
(Siirilä 2009, p277) 
2.8 Muting function 
When muting function is activated, the safety device is switched off temporarily. 
The muting function shall not cause additional risk of injury. Safety must be carried 
out with other way. (SFS-EN ISO 13849-1, p72) 
Passivation is used in automatic systems, for example transporting product 
between different stages of the process. Most commonly used safety devices, 
used for muting, are light curtains and light grids. The muting function requires 
additional sensors that the function can be executed. The product must have effect 
to the sensors in correct order and time. The sensors will detect the wrong type of 
object this way. Figure 4 illustrates the muting function. (Siirilä 2008 p160) 
 
Figure 4 Muting system with safety light grid. 
(Siemens 2012) 
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3 SAFETY COMPONENTS 
3.1 Fail-safe CPU 
Standard data as well as the safety data is handled by the fail-safe CPU. The fail-
safe CPU, also called safety-PLC, provides an efficient control and monitoring for 
industrial purposes, when machine - or process safety is needed. Safety-PLC is 
connected via fieldbus technology to a variety of sensors and engine management 
components. An integrated complex system can be executed with safety-PLC. 
Diagnostics can be used to find causes of faults and production interruptions are 
therefore shorter. The system utilizes the open fieldbus communications systems 
such as PROFIBUS DP, PROFINET or wireless security communication IWLAN. 
STEP 7 –program and its safety license is needed to communicate with the safety-
program. The safety-programming is made with the LAD and FBD programming 
languages in STEP 7, S7 Distributed Safety - or TIA Portal environment. (Siemens 
2014a) 
 
Figure 5 Siemens fail-safe programmable logic controller. 
(Siemens 2014a) 
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3.2 Safety relay 
The purpose of safety relay is to ensure circuit’s operability and safety. The safety 
relays can be found wide variety of uses and is selected according to the usage. 
The safety relay has the following uses: 
– Monitoring emergency stop buttons, safety switches and light curtains. 
– Monitoring contactors and control valves.  
– Monitoring safety circuits against short-circuits.  
– Monitoring engine stop.  
– Monitoring safety relay’s own activities. 
– Short-circuit supervision. 
Figure 6 shows circuit that does not have a safety relay. The following problems 
are possible:  
– Circuit’s control voltage may conduct directly to the contactor in case of 
short circuits.  
– The control button’s contact damage can cause contactor to remain on.  
– Contact’s sticking can cause hazard or breakdown. 
 (OEM) 
 
 
Figure 6 System without safety relay 
(OEM) 
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3.3 Safety switcgear 
This section contains safety sensors, used types of hatches and doors. The safety 
switchgear consists of two parts, the safety switch and the separate actuator. 
When door or hatch is in production position, the safety switch and its actuator are 
close to each other. 
3.3.1 Safety switch 
The safety switch is made up of two parts, the safety switch and the separate 
actuator key. The switches include a force guided contacts, which are directed to 
the influence of actuator key. Safety interlocking switch locks the actuator key 
inside the switch. The safety switch can be equipped with a unique coding. 
Actuator key and switch are shaped in a way that works only together. The coding 
is made central section of the actuator key as in figure 7. Coding prevents 
manipulation of the safety switch with an external actuator.  
Even if the safety switch has two-channels, it has a single-channel mechanic (the 
key part). A single safety switch might be suitable for PL a, b and c applications. If 
can be ensured that the mechanics does not break, the device could be suitable 
for applications PL d. If two single channel safety switches are used to execute the 
same safety feature, PL e is possible. 
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Figure 7 Typical safety switch. 
(Schmersal 2011) 
3.3.2 Safety sensors 
Magnetic, inductive and RFID-sensors are the typical safety sensors. The main 
advantage of the sensors compared to conventional safety switches is contactless 
technology. External mechanical wear will not happen.  
Magnetic safety sensor consists of two separate components, the sensor, as well 
as the counter-magnetic actuator, see figure 8. Actuator’s magnets are in a certain 
order, so that any magnet cannot activate the sensor. The magnetic sensor 
includes a reed contacts which are operated with the magnets.  
The difference between the magnetic-, Inductive- and RFID-sensor are a little 
more complexity in their structure. Inductive- and RFID-sensors can be equipped 
with a unique coding. Coding will reduce the possibility to manipulation. 
34 
 
 
Figure 8 Schmersal magnetic safety sensor. 
(Schmersal 2012a) 
3.4 Safety light curtain and safety light grid 
The safety light curtains and - light grids consists of a transmitter and a receiver. 
The transmitter sends infrared light to receiver, which monitors the coming light 
with safety monitor. Light curtains are used to prevent access to the danger zones. 
If a light beam is interrupted between transmitter and receiver, the safety monitor 
detects this and sends a signal to the safety-related control system for the 
necessary actions. The main difference between safety light curtain and light grid 
is quantity of the light beams. (Schmersal 2013) 
The typical light grid has 1, 2, 3, or 4 light beams. The light is emitted directly 
horizontally from the transmitter to the receiver. Sometimes beams are directed to 
emit light from corner to corner creating a cross to the middle of light grid.  
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Figure 9 Pallet wrapping machine’s safety light grids (four yellow posts, two at 
front and two further behind the wrapping machine). 
3.5 Safety components of AC-drives 
The AC-drives can be stopped without need to cut power down immediately. The 
AC-drive can be equipped with a specific Safe Torque Off -safety circuit board, 
which integrates the AC-drive into the safety-related control system. This feature 
eliminates drive’s start up delay and ease use of the drive. (Vacon 2014) 
Figure 10 illustrates the behaviour of the motor during safety-related stop. After 
stop command (red arrow), the motor slows down the speed linearly to till standstill 
(blue line). A moment after standstill, AC-drive is triggered to the Safe Torque Off 
–state (STO arrow). An external timer is needed to execute Safe Stop 1 (SS1) 
function. The timer could be OFF-delayed safety relay which delay time is the Δt in 
picture 10. During class 0 STO -function, STO state is launched immediately when 
stop is requested and motor slows the speed down freely. (Vacon 2014) 
36 
 
 
Figure 10 Safe Stop 1 (SS1). 
(Siemens 2014b) 
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4 FIELDBUSSES 
4.1 AS-interface 
The AS-i fieldbus consists of one master device and maximum quantity of 31 slave 
devices. Four input - and four output devices can be connected into each slave. 
The master unit and the slaves are connected to each other with the same two-
wire cable. Cable length can be up to 100 meters and with repeater the length can 
be extended up to 300 meters. The system may use any topology selected. AS-i 
field bus is used to reduce the maintenance and installation costs. New AS-i 
components can be easily connected to the existing system. The new component 
is connected to the nearest AS-i cable. (AS-interface) 
The AS-interface is called AS-i Safety at Work if safety-related data is transferred 
simultaneously with standard data through the same AS-i bus. (Siirilä 2009, p 128) 
Each safety-related slave is identified with 8x4 bit code table. Each slave’s code 
table is taught to the AS-i master. During the production the master device 
compares the received and taught tables. The AS-i master cause machine to stop 
if found any of following deviations: 
- Communication is interrupted. 
- Transmitted 8*4 bit tables are wrong. 
- Safe slave is missing or destroyed. 
- Delayed slave responses were detected.  
(AS-interface) 
4.2 ProfiBUS 
The Profibus is an open, digital communication system with wide range of 
applications, particularly in the fields of factory and process automation. The 
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Profibus is suitable for both fast, time-critical applications and complex 
communication tasks. (PROFIBUS user organisation 2002) 
Profibus DP (Decentralized Periphery) is the simple, fast, cyclic and deterministic 
process data exchange between a bus master and the assigned slave devices. 
Profibus DP has three versions DP-V0, DP-V1 and DP-V2. The newest version 
DP-V2 provides for direct slave-to-slave communication with an isochronous bus 
cycle. (PROFIBUS user organisation 2002) 
The Profibus is called PROFIsafe if safety-related data is transferred 
simultaneously with standard data through the same bus. (Siirilä 2009, p 128) 
4.3 DP / AS-i F-link 
The AS-i devices are connected to the fail-safe CPU via Profibus DP. The AS-i 
and the Profibus DP are linked to each other with the DP / AS-i F-Link -device. 
The DP / AS-I F-Link provide data communication between AS-i slaves and fail-
safe CPU. The DP / AS-i F-Link operate at the same time as AS-i master and 
Profibus DP’s slave. Device consists of two AS-i channels: A and B. 62 standard 
slave devices, or 31 safety slave devices can be connected to the DP / AS-I F-
Link. (Siemens 2006) 
Figure 11 is an example about a system using the DP / AS-i F-Link. The image 
illustrates interconnection between different devices. Fail-safe CPU monitors AS-i 
busses emergency stop button, as well as the protective door’s safety switches. 
The fail-safe CPU controls contactors Q1 and Q2 via distributed I / O. 
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Figure 11 Example of system configuration with DP / AS-i F-Link. 
(Siemens 2008) 
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5 PALLETIZING SYSTEM 
5.1 System review 
Palletizing system includes elevator cells, robotic cells, pallet carrier cell and pallet 
wrapping cell, see figure 12. Products containing boxes are lifted with elevator cell 
2.5 meters above from ground to till conveyors. The conveyors carry the boxes 
from all cells to robotic cells and if necessary from lines 3, 9 and 10 to till trolley 
cell. The robotic cells load boxes on to the pallets. The pallet carrier cell carries 
finished pallets from robotic cells to pallet wrapping machine. Wrapping protects 
and supports the products during delivery.  
 
Figure 12 Overview of the palletizing machine. 
 
Palletizing system’s data transfer is carried out with the Profibus DP - and the AS-i 
interfaces. System’s execution is present in figure 13. A single fail-safe CPU 
controls everything except wrapping machine, which have own PLC. However 
wrapping machine’s safety devices are connected to the fail-safe CPU. Each cell 
and robot has own central electrical units, where distributed I / O and other 
devices are available. 
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Figure 13 Overview of the palletizing system Profibus - and AS-i busses. 
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5.2 Risk assessment of robotic cells 
The original risk assessments made by manufacturer were not available, so 
methods from Siirilä’s book (Koneturvallisuus, 2008) were used. Guidance from 
Valio Ltd’s own instructions were also used. The risk assessment conducted 
concerns the robotic cells from 1 to 10, as well as trolley cell. Due to the cells’ 
similar operation, it was not considered necessary to carry out the risk assessment 
in each cell separately. With the information from risk assessment, conclusions 
were made as follows: The robot cells’ service doors old safety switches are too 
risky to use and the switches must be upgraded during spring 2014. 
5.3 Service doors 
The purpose of service doors is to prevent person’s access to hazard zones, when 
robot is operating. The door’s position is monitored with AS-i -compatible Siemens 
safety switch. The service door’s locking is executed with sideways movable latch. 
The safety switch’s actuator key is attached to the latch. The latch protects the 
safety switch and it’s actuator against lateral forces, which are caused if the door 
is pulled, when door latch is in lock position. 
During the inspection, it was found that safety switch’s actuator key may hit to the 
door frame, if the latch is in mid-position (figures 15 and 16). Marks on the door 
frame were detected each hinge equipped door. Failure is fixed by moving the 
latch so that it extends slightly beyond the safety switch’s actuator (figure 17). The 
failure was easy to repair by drilling new mounting holes and making new treads to 
them (figure 18 and 19). 
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Figure 14 Front view of the service door. 
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Figure 15 Hitting marks on the door frame. 
 
 
Figure 16 Safety switches actuator key may hit to the door frame. 
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Figure 17 The latch is too short. 
 
 
Figure 18 Fixing the latches. 
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Figure 19 Improved latch in place. 
 
If the latch hit hard to the door frame, it can cause fractures into the mounting 
screws or threads can be damaged. This could cause a serious accident, if the 
robot is stopped by opening the service door and then partially damaged safety 
switch’s key remain in place. 
Referring to the theory section, when safety-related control system is PL d and 
category 3, control system must be able to carry out a safety feature even if the 
system has one fault. The requirement to satisfy the claim, the safety switches 
actuator can’t fail. Due to a safety switch’s single channel mechanical parts, it was 
decided to use the additional safety on service doors. Cells 1 to 10 will be 
equipped with RFID-type of safety sensors (figure 20). Each cell has 32 free, 
unused AS-i device addresses. Use of two safety devices will allow safety function 
to be accomplished if either of the devices damages.  
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Figure 20 Service doors’ new RFID-sensor. 
(Schmersal 2012b) 
The trolley cell does not contain an AS-i fieldbus, so the new safety switch’s 
wirings are executed with the conventional wirings. The cell has a safety input card 
that has space for two single devices or one dual channel safety device. The dual 
channel device will be used. 
Service door’s adequate safety could be achieved by replacing the old safety 
switch with one non-contact type of safety sensor. However, this is not going to be 
used, because two switches give a more secure solution. Second idea was to use 
two single-channel safety switches. The first channel could be the basic safety 
switch and the second channel’s device a hinge switch. The advantage of this kind 
of system would be a good ability to prevent manipulation. This is not approved, 
because of the cross-channel asynchronous operation as well as difficulties 
mounting the hinge-switch. 
5.4 Pallet removal doors 
Pneumatic operated cylinder opens and closes the pallet removal door. The pallet 
removal door allows automatic removal of the finished pallets from the cell. The 
pallet doors’ position is monitored with a safety switch. Pallet removal door is open 
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only, when finished pallet moves from the robot cell to the pallet carrier. The safety 
switch is muted during pallet removal. Doors have had problems with actuators not 
contacting with the safety device. It was decided that the pallet removal doors are 
to be equipped with contactless safety sensors. Because of cheap prize, Allen 
Bradley safety sensors were chosen. 
 
Figure 21 Safety switch’s actuator does not always hit to the right place. 
5.5 Pallet feeders 
Pallets are automatically supplied to the robotic cell with the pallet feeder. Lowest 
pallet of stack is moved to robotic cell’s work zone with help of conveyors and 
stack lifters. The pallet feeder during production is illustrated in figure 22.  
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Figure 22 Front view of pallet feeder. 
 
The pallet feeder’s safety was considered to be in order. Here again, 
improvements were planned for the machine. The most likely danger occurs when 
the pallets are loaded into too high towers to the pallet feeder. However it is not 
possible to transport very high stacks of pallets inside factory. In addition, 
employees have been instructed to stack no more than 12 pallet high stacks, see 
figure 22. If a pallet stack height measurement device would be built, the best 
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result could be obtained with a single light grid. Manipulation would be difficult 
enough with the light grid. 
5.6 Elevator cells 
According to the risk assessment, the elevator cells’ safety devices were 
considered to be in order. The cells have two doors and their position is monitored 
by the Siemens safety switch, same as the service doors’ of robotic cells. Any 
changes to the elevator cells were not required. 
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Figure 23 Elevator cell. 
5.7  Other machines 
Pallet carrier cell, wrapping machine and dismantling robot will be equipped with 
additional safety sensors. The dismantling robot has four service doors where the 
wrapping machine and the pallet carrier have both two service doors. All eight 
doors will be equipped with one additional RFID-safety sensor.  
5.8 Example calculation of a service doors performance level with 
additional safety sensor. 
The robotic cell’s service doors safety function is executed with: 
1. Siemens failsafe CPU 
2. Siemens DP / AS-I F-Link 
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3. Service doors safety position switch 2-channel (Siemens) 
4. Service doors safety position sensor 2-channel (Schmersal) 
5. Safety relay (robots electrical center needs two relay output contacts) 
6. Siemens safety-related distributed output device 
7. Robots power supply contactors 
Table 13 presents the safety data collected from manufacturers. B10d, MTTFd and 
DCavg were calculated from the safety data with the help of the theory section. 
MTTFd and DCavg calculations are presented at sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2. Results 
and conclusions made, are presented at summary section (5.8.3). 
Table 13 Data collected from the manufacturers. B10d and MTTFd are calculated 
values, all DCavg –values estimated. 
(* Siemens 2010, ** Schmersal 2012b, *** Sick 2013, ****Schneider Electric 2014) 
 
5.8.1 Total MTTFd level of safety function 
Manufacturers reported PFHD -values were used. Tables of appendixes 1 and 2 
were used to convert the PFHD to MTTFd. The tables are based on the ISO 
13849-1’s annex K. Lower MTTFd values than 100 years are converted with 
appendix 1. Higher MTTFd values than 100 years can be evaluated with the table 
that can be found in appendix 2. 
  
Data 
source Type Product
SIL PFHd PL Cat
Life
tim
e
Ratio of 
dangero
us 
failures
B10 B10d
MTTFd 
(years)
Dcavg 
(%)
*
Siemens CPU 319F
6ES7318-3FL00-
0AB0
3 4,00E-09 e 4 20 - - - 460 ≥99
* DP / AS-i F-Link 3RK3141-.CD10 3 3,00E-09 e 4 20 - - - 750 ≥99
*
Safety position 
switch
Siemens 3SF1...-
...V..
- - - - 20 20 1000000 5000000 7576 90
**
Safety sensor
Schmersal 
RSS36AS
3 5,13E-10 e 4 20 - - - 2300 ≥99
*** Safety relay UE48-20S 3 3,00E-08 e 4 20 - - - 82 ≥99
*
Fail-safe output 
module
6ES7318-3FB02-
0AB0
3 1,00E-10 e 4 20 - - - >2500 ≥99
**** Power supply 
contactors
Schneider 
electric, TESYS, 
nominal load
- - - - 20 73 1000000 1369863 2076 99
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Siemens safety switch: 
B10d = B10 / ratio of dangerous failures % = 1 000 000 / 20% = 5 000 000 
hop = 15 hours* 
dop = 330 days* 
tcycle = (15h x 60min x 60s) / 20 = 2700s** 
*Production operational in two shifts. (7.5h x 7.5h = 15h). 
**On average the door is opened 20 times a day. 
    
              ⁄
      
     (2) 
nop = (330d * 15h * 3600s/h) / 2700s = 6600 
      
    
       
     (1) 
MTTFd = 5 000 000 / (0,1 x 6600) = 7575,758 (years) 
MTTFd of Siemens safety position switch is approximately 7576 years. 
 
Schneider electric Tesys contactors: 
B10d = B10 / ratio of dangerous failures % = 1 000 000 / 73% = 1 369 863 
hop = 15 hours* 
dop = 330 days* 
tcycle = (15h x 60min x 60s) / 20 = 2700s** 
* Production operational in two shifts. (7.5h x 7.5h = 15h). 
**On average the door is opened 20 times a day. 
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              ⁄
      
     (2) 
nop = (330d x 15h x 3600s/h) / 2700s = 6600 
      
    
       
     (1) 
MTTFd = 1 369 863 / (0,1 x 6600) = 2075.55 (years) 
MTTFd of Schneider electric contactors are approximately 2076 years. 
 
Next the whole channel’s average MTTFd is calculated. All individual MTTFd –
values are connected. 
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MTTFd = 58,306 ~ 58 (years) 
5.8.2 DCavg of safety function 
Manufacturers do not always give information about their product’s diagnostic 
coverage. All devices which are performance level e, the devices’ diagnostic 
coverage must be at least 99 percent and that is why for individual devices’ DCavg 
was estimated ≥99 percent, see table 13. For Siemens safety switch the DCavg 
was evaluated and selected with table 9. From table the following part was 
selected: 
- Cyclic test stimulus by dynamic change of the input signals = 90 %. 
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Contacts must close and open within a specified time and order so that the 
machine can be started. This way the machine recognizes damaged contact.  
For Schneider electric Tesys contactors DC was selected with table 11. From the 
table the following part was selected: 
- Direct monitoring (e.q. electrical position monitoring of control valves, 
monitoring of electromechanical devices by mechanically linked contact 
elements = 99 %.) 
Safety PLC monitors contactors’ actual position with auxiliary contacts which are 
connected directly to the contactors’ main contacts. This way safety PLC 
recognizes damaged contacts. Next the average diagnostic coverage of the 
service door safety-related control system is calculated with the formulas 
presented in the theory part: 
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DCavg = 98,931 ~ 98,9 (%) 
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5.8.3 Summary 
Table 7 presents that if system’s MTTFd is 58 years, the channels MTTFd is high. 
Table 8 presents that if the average diagnostic coverage is 98,9 percent, the level 
of DCavg is then medium. With this information the performance level of a single 
channel of a safety-related control system can be defined with theory section’s 
figure 3. From the picture, it can be concluded that the calculated performance 
level is d.  
Siemens safety switch drops the average diagnostic coverage of whole system 
from 99 to 98.9 percent and, therefore, PL drops from e to d. However, both the 
safety devices of the service door are two channelled and working parallel, so they 
can be perceived as one safety device. If the control system monitors 
synchronously both the device’s opening and closing, the service door’s safety 
switch’s combined DC could be 100 percent. Nevertheless by using only the safety 
sensor, the control system’s performance level is e and therefore DCavg is at least 
99 percent. Service door’s new performance level will be e. 
5.9 Requirements for safety program 
Service door has two dual-channel safety devices and therefore the total amount 
of channels is four. The control system will be monitoring all the four channels. 
The control system will be able to monitor the synchronous closing and opening of 
both devices. This will allow the detection of a jammed safety device actuator. 
Pallet removal doors’ new safety switches do not need any program changes. 
5.10 Implemention of changes 
Installing and programming will be done by the palletising system’s manufacturer 
Orfer Oy. The changes will be made during the spring, at a weekend, when the 
factory unit’s production schedule allows a stoppage. Orfer Oy will make the 
installation of sensors, connections, program changes, as well as the necessary 
changes to the machinery documentation.  
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The implementation of changes was given to a third party because of insufficient 
knowledge about the palletising system program and, in addition, Valio Ltd does 
not have the required safety licence for accessing the safety program. 
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6 SUMMARY 
Palletising system is made with very high quality components. The switch of the 
service doors is not the best solution for the robotic safety device which is used 
quite often. Elsewhere any safety defects were not discovered. Some mechanical 
problems were found in the existing safety switch installations and they were 
repaired. 
Risk assessment, as well as a more detailed examination of the control system 
should have been done separately to the wrapping machine and to the pallet 
carrier cell. These machines do not necessarily need to be equipped with 
additional new safety sensors. At the beginning, the work was limited to the robotic 
cells’ service doors only, and for this reason risk assessments for the wrapping 
and pallet carrier machines were not made. However, the improvement costs of 
the wrapping machine and pallet carrier cells are small. The acquisition of the 
safety license of STEP 7 will be considered, as it could be used for other factory’s 
applications in the future. 
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